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I. INTRODUCTION

What, if anything, gives a state sufficiently plenary power over
a person that the state may adjudicate claims against the person even
if the claims arose elsewhere? Particularly with regard to
corporations, this basic question has lacked a clear answer. The
standard for general jurisdiction remains unsatisfactorily vague, with
ambiguous Supreme Court guidance on doctrine and even less

* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Edward Hartnett, Ethan
Leib, and Benjamin Zipursky for helpful discussion.
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explanation of why such jurisdiction exists. The coming Supreme
Court term offers the Court an opportunity to clarify.
The case before the Supreme Court—DaimlerChrysler AG v.
Bauman1—presents an easy jurisdictional question on its facts.
Argentine plaintiffs sued a German corporation based on events that
occurred in Argentina. They filed their lawsuit in California,2
although the claims did not arise out of California and the defendant
had no physical presence in California. Unless the Supreme Court
takes an expansive view of imputed contacts through corporate
subsidiaries, which would be surprising, the Court likely will reverse
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that California had general jurisdiction over
DaimlerChrysler AG. Nevertheless, the case offers the Court an
opportunity to clarify the general jurisdiction standard it announced
two years ago in Goodyear Dunlop Tires, S.A. v. Brown.3
Goodyear, too, was an easy case.4 The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the state court ruling that North Carolina had
general jurisdiction over three foreign Goodyear subsidiaries.5 But
despite the ease of the Goodyear case, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for
the Court offered a revised formulation of the standard for general
jurisdiction over corporations. Rather than rely solely on earlier
language about “continuous and systematic” contacts,6 Justice
Ginsburg drew an analogy to an individual’s domicile and described
1.
644 F.3d 909, 921–24 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
2.
The case was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) permits a federal court to exercise personal
jurisdiction if a state court could do so, the case raises the issue of the territorial limits of
California courts. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
3.
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). Before 2011, the Supreme Court had addressed general
jurisdiction over corporations only twice, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984), and Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
4.
For commentaries noting the one-sidedness of Goodyear in light of prior decisions, see
Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549, 573 (2012); Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro:
Observations from a Transnational and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 612 (2012);
Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527,
527 (2012).
5.
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857.
6.
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416 (finding that defendant lacked “the kind of continuous
and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins”); Perkins, 342 U.S.
at 445 (noting that defendant had been carrying on “continuous and systematic” business in
Ohio, where it had established temporary headquarters while its foreign operations were halted).
When the Supreme Court introduced the “continuous and systematic” language, it was in the
context of specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“ ‘Presence’ in the state in this sense has never been
doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on . . . .”); id. at 320 (noting that International
Shoe’s activities in Washington “were systematic and continuous throughout the years in
question”).
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the general jurisdiction standard in terms of whether the corporation
was “essentially at home in the forum State.”7 The Court concluded
that North Carolina could not assert general jurisdiction because the
defendants were “in no sense at home in North Carolina.”8
The home-state test for general jurisdiction makes sense but
remains both under-theorized and ambiguously expressed. In
DaimlerChrysler, the Court has a chance not only to express the
home-state test with greater clarity, but also to explain why the homestate test makes sense for general jurisdiction.9 In addition, the
DaimlerChrysler case raises questions about imputation of corporate
contacts. Explicit adoption of a home-state test would allow the Court
to explain why the contacts of an agent do not establish general
jurisdiction over a principal.
II. WHY THE HOME-STATE TEST MAKES SENSE FOR GENERAL
JURISDICTION
A. Specific Jurisdiction versus General Jurisdiction
In both Goodyear and DaimlerChrysler, judges failed to
appreciate fully the difference between specific and general
jurisdiction. In Goodyear, this failure led to the North Carolina courts’
misapplication of the stream-of-commerce theory. In DaimlerChrysler,
it led to the Ninth Circuit’s misapplication of agency principles. In
each case, the courts seemed to treat general jurisdiction as merely a
variation on specific jurisdiction with a higher level of contacts.10
The crucial difference between specific jurisdiction and general
jurisdiction is not a quantitative difference in the level of required
contacts; it is a qualitative difference in the basis of the state’s
7.
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
8.
Id. at 2857.
9.
The Supreme Court could decline to address the jurisdictional questions in
DaimlerChrysler because the plaintiffs’ primary substantive claims may have been undermined
by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (addressing the Alien Tort
Statute) and Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (addressing the Torture
Victims Protection Act). This article proceeds on the assumption that the Supreme Court will
take the opportunity to address the important question on which it granted certiorari.
10. Perhaps the problem can be traced to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). In that case, which was one of specific jurisdiction, the Supreme Court introduced the
concept of general jurisdiction by mentioning that “there have been instances in which the
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature
as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities.” Id. at 318. Notably, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) made no distinctions based
on whether claims were related or unrelated to the forum state. As Allan Stein points out, “the
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction is an artifact of the post-International Shoe
model.” Stein, supra note 4, at 534.
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adjudicatory power. Specific jurisdiction is justified by a state’s
regulatory interest in the conduct at issue. General jurisdiction is
justified by the relationship between a state and those who make the
state their home. Although both specific jurisdiction and general
jurisdiction concern a defendant’s due process right not to be subject to
the coercive power of an unrelated sovereign, the two types of
jurisdiction involve different ways that a sovereign may relate to the
controversy.
Specific jurisdiction begins with the connection between the
controversy and the forum state. By acting purposefully toward the
state, the defendant subjects itself to the state’s adjudicatory power
with regard to claims that arise out of that conduct. The Supreme
Court explained in International Shoe that in-state conduct “may give
rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure that requires
the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in
most instances, hardly be said to be undue.”11
General jurisdiction, by contrast, does not begin with a
relationship between the controversy and the forum state. Rather, the
logic of general jurisdiction begins and ends with the relationship
between the defendant and the forum state. By definition, the
controversy need not have any connection to the forum state other
than through the state’s relationship with the defendant. General
jurisdiction asks whether the defendant’s relationship with the forum
state is such that the relationship alone gives the state power to
adjudicate any controversy with regard to that defendant.
B. General Jurisdiction and the Citizen-State Relationship
General jurisdiction is premised on the idea that a connection
between a person and a sovereign may be significant enough that it
gives the sovereign a kind of plenary power over the person, a power
that extends beyond state boundaries. The logic of general jurisdiction
is that a state has power over its citizens that is not entirely confined
to in-state activities. A state may tax its citizens’ out-of-state income,12
11. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added); see also J. McIntyre Machinery
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality) (“The question is whether a
defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the
jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to
judgment concerning that conduct.”).
12. See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n of Miss., 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932) (holding that a
state has power to tax its citizens “on income derived wholly from activities carried on outside
the state,” because “domicile, in itself, establishes a basis for taxation.”); Meir Feder, Goodyear,
“Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 691
(2012).
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summon its citizens to return for jury duty,13 and in other ways
regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities.14
In Milliken v. Meyer, the Supreme Court explained jurisdiction
in terms of each state’s power over its citizens. Drawing a connection
to “the authority of the United States over its absent citizens,” the
Court explained that “the authority of a state over one of its citizens is
not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state.”15 The
incidents of domicile include amenability to suit, and “[t]he
responsibilities of [state] citizenship arise out of the relationship to the
state which domicile creates.”16 The Milliken opinion does not draw
clear distinctions among residence, domicile, and citizenship, but the
mix of terminology does not obscure the Court’s straightforward
reasoning: when a person establishes a home-state relationship with a
state, the relationship gives the state certain powers over the person,
including power to subject the person to judgments of the state’s
courts.
C. Corporations and the Home-State Test for General Jurisdiction
A similar logic extends to corporations. Although some rights
and duties of citizenship, such as voting and jury service, do not
extend to corporations, the home-state idea at the heart of Milliken
makes sense in the corporate context. When a corporation establishes
a home-state relationship with a state, the relationship comes with
responsibilities including amenability to suit. In contrast to specific
jurisdiction, where the state has an interest in the conduct at issue in
the dispute, general jurisdiction concerns the state’s interest in the
defendant itself by virtue of the defendant’s relationship with the
forum state.

13. See, e.g., THE MASSACHUSETTS JURY SYSTEM, http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/jurysystem-b.html (last visited July 18, 2013) (noting jury eligibility of temporarily absent residents
and college students).
14. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (“If the United States may control the
conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not
likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which
the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.”); Stein,
supra note 4, at 538; see also I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1309,
1328–35 (2012) (analyzing, in the context of medical tourism, the extent to which a home country
may prohibit conduct by its citizens abroad).
15. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940).
16. Id. at 464; see also Feder, supra note 12, at 691 (“The only basis our law has
traditionally recognized for state authority over conduct unrelated to the state is the unique
relationship between a state and its citizens or residents.”); Stein, supra note 4, at 539 (“[G]iving
the home state plenary judicial authority over its citizens comports with a broader, universal
authority that states normally possess over their citizens.”).
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Although home-state may not offer perfect precision, it aptly
captures the idea of general jurisdiction. Particularly in contrast to
the continuous and systematic language that has befuddled courts for
too long, the home-state test provides better grounding.
What is a corporation’s home state? The soundest answer,
although less neat than other possible formulations, is that a
corporation is at home in its state of incorporation as well as its
principal place of business, and that in exceptional cases a corporation
may have more than one principal place of business for this purpose.
The state of incorporation should be considered a home state for
general jurisdiction. When an entity exists because it was created
under the laws of a particular state, the state’s assertion of judicial
power over it does not constitute territorial overreaching.17 Principal
place of business, too, should be considered a corporation’s home state
for purposes of general personal jurisdiction. The relationship of a
corporation to its primary home is one that gives the state a
generalized interest in the conduct and liability of the corporation. In
this sense, General Motors Company is at home in Michigan and the
Walt Disney Company is at home in California, even though each of
these companies was incorporated in Delaware and thus also could be
subject to general jurisdiction there.
In exceptional circumstances, a corporation might have more
than one home state even in addition to its state(s) of incorporation. A
company may have dual headquarters, each of which could reasonably
be considered home.18 Or the company may have executive control in
one state but primary operations in another. Unlike the definition of
principal place of business under the diversity jurisdiction statute,19
there is no reason why general jurisdiction cannot encompass multiple
home states in special cases.
When thinking about the possibility of multiple home states,
the analogy to citizenship is helpful. While the citizen-state
relationship need not be perfectly exclusive, neither can it be diffuse.
17. See Stein, supra note 4, at 547 (explaining such jurisdiction in terms of voluntary
submission to the state’s authority).
18. See Phred Dvorak, Why Multiple Headquarters Multiply, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007
(discussing the growth of internationally dual-headquartered companies). The Halliburton
Company, for example, maintains headquarters in both Houston and Dubai. See Clifford Krauss,
Halliburton to Move Headquarters to Dubai, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007. One could reasonably
name Texas, the United Arab Emirates, and Delaware (its state of incorporation) as
Halliburton’s homes, because the company has affirmatively established a home-state
relationship with each of these sovereigns. But it would stretch the concept beyond recognition to
say that Halliburton’s home state is each of the dozens of states and nations where it maintains
substantial offices or operations.
19. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010) (interpreting “principal place of
business” in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to mean the corporation’s nerve center).
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Individuals often maintain subnational or supranational citizenship
alongside their national citizenship.20 Moreover, the United States
and many other nations recognize the possibility of dual-national
citizenship.21 To the extent these versions of multiple citizenship
permit allegiance to more than one sovereign, they presume at most a
small number of states with which the citizen forms such a
relationship.
In sum, just as Milliken justified general jurisdiction over
individuals in terms of the relationship between a person and the
person’s home state, a home-state test makes sense when applied to
corporations.22 As far as due process is concerned, a state court may
assert power over a person (whether individual or corporate) in the
person’s home state. A corporation should be considered at home in its
state of incorporation as well as its principal place of business. In
exceptional cases, a corporation might have more than one principal
place of business for purposes of general jurisdiction, but a home state
should be where the corporation maintains its headquarters or its
principal operations, not merely someplace where a corporation does
business or maintains a physical presence.
III. GOODYEAR’S HESITANT ARTICULATION OF THE HOME-STATE TEST
In Goodyear, the Supreme Court stopped short of articulating
what I am calling the home-state test. Three times, the Court used the
phrase at home, but never did the Court explicitly state that this was
the test courts should apply to determine whether the exercise of
20. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 20(1) (“Every
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of
the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.”).
21. See Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 169 (1795) (opinion of Rutledge, C.J.) (“[A] man may,
at the same time, enjoy the rights of citizenship under two governments.”); U.S. STATE DEP’T
SERVS., Dual Nationality, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html (visited July
18, 2013) (“The concept of dual nationality means that a person is a citizen of two countries at
the same time. . . . The U.S. Government recognizes that dual nationality exists but does not
encourage it as a matter of policy because of the problems it may cause.”).
22. Michael Hoffheimer writes that “[t]he restriction of general jurisdiction over a
corporation to a place where it is ‘at home’ is troubling.” Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 583.
Calling the “at home” language a “neologism lacking any fixed legal meaning,” id. at 583, he
argues that “the law recognizes that a corporation may have significant legal relationships with
more than one state.” Id. at 584. While Hoffheimer is correct that “at home” lacks a fixed legal
meaning, the phrase offers more precision than the notion of continuous and systematic contacts,
which has held a disturbingly wide range of meanings in the cases. Hoffheimer is also correct
that corporations have significant legal relationships with multiple states. But the question is
not what justifies power in connection with conduct related to the forum state; the question is
what sort of relationship justifies plenary judicial power.
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general jurisdiction complies with due process.23 Moreover, the Court
qualified its language in ways that could call into question whether it
meant to adopt a home-state test.
The closest the Court came in Goodyear to announcing a homestate test was in the fourth paragraph of the opinion. Having set up
the connection between the state’s coercive power and defendants’ due
process rights, and having drawn the distinction between specific and
general jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg wrote:
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any
and all claims against them when their affiliations with
the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render
them essentially at home in the forum State.24
There are four problems with treating this sentence as a homestate test for corporate general jurisdiction. First, by stating that a
court may assert jurisdiction “when” rather than “only when,” the
sentence arguably states a sufficient condition rather than a necessary
one. Second, Justice Ginsburg used the qualifier “essentially at home.”
Third, by invoking “continuous and systematic,” she seemed to
embrace the old standard. And fourth, by framing the statement as
one about jurisdiction over “foreign (sister-state or foreign country)
corporations,” she implied that general jurisdiction extends beyond instate corporations.
Nonetheless, it makes sense to derive a home-state test from
Goodyear. The phrase essentially at home can be understood as
accommodating Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,25 the
only case in which the Supreme Court approved general jurisdiction
over a corporation. In Perkins, the defendant was a foreign corporation
that temporarily ran its business from Ohio, where the company
president was located, while operations in the Philippines were shut
down during wartime. The Benguet mining company was “essentially
at home” in Ohio while headquartered there, despite its permanent
home abroad. The Goodyear language about general jurisdiction over
foreign corporations similarly can be explained by Perkins, but also
may simply refer to any defendant incorporated out-of-state but with
its principal place of business in the forum state.

23. The Court also signaled a home-state test by citing Lea Brilmayer’s work on the
significance of unique affiliations. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988)).
24. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
25. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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The Goodyear Court’s next reference to “at home” omitted the
word “essentially” and the language about foreign corporations.
Significantly, the Court framed the concept by drawing an analogy to
individual domicile: “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is
fairly regarded as at home.”26 But even this language invites
questions, because the paradigm forum for general jurisdiction is not
necessarily the only forum.
When the Goodyear Court came around to stating that North
Carolina could not exercise general jurisdiction over the defendants, it
stated the holding in terms that first seemed to embrace a home-state
test. But the very next sentence recalled the “continuous and
systematic” language, leaving some doubt about which test the Court
was applying.27 Although the Goodyear Court’s multiple references to
whether the defendants were “at home” in North Carolina leave a
strong impression of a home-state test for corporate general
jurisdiction, each reference falls short of an outright adoption of such a
test. If the Court means to adopt such a test, then in DaimlerChrysler
it should embrace the home-state test unequivocally.
Notwithstanding the complicating language in Goodyear, it
seems clear the Court meant to embrace at least some version of a
home-state test. In J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro,28 a specific
jurisdiction case decided the same day, the Justices’ references to
general jurisdiction support the view that Goodyear endorsed a homestate test. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, citing Goodyear,
stated, “Citizenship or domicile—or, by analogy, incorporation or
principal place of business for corporations—also indicates general
submission to a State’s powers. . . . By contrast, those who live or
operate primarily outside a State have a due process right not to be
subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.”29 Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent, also citing Goodyear, likewise assumed a homestate test: “McIntyre UK surely is not subject to general (all-purpose)
jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, for that foreign-country corporation
is hardly ‘at home’ in New Jersey.”30
26. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54.
27. See id. at 2857 (“Unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity
was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina. Their attenuated
connections to the State fall far short of the “continuous and systematic general business
contacts” necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims
unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.”) (citations omitted).
28. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
29. Id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
30. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOME-STATE TEST
The home-state test should resolve several questions about
general jurisdiction. First, it suggests that corporations are not subject
to general jurisdiction in states other than their states of
incorporation and principal places of business, even if they conduct
regular and substantial business in the forum state. Second, it informs
how courts should consider the contacts of related corporate entities,
particularly suggesting the inapplicability of agency principles to
general jurisdiction. Finally, the home-state test should lead courts to
abandon the so-called “reasonableness prong” for general jurisdiction.
A. Out-of-State Corporations with Substantial In-State Presence
It should be clear by now that the Due Process Clause prohibits
general jurisdiction in cases like Goodyear and DaimlerChrysler where
defendants lack any substantial presence in the forum state. But the
more interesting question is the extent to which courts
constitutionally may exercise general jurisdiction over defendants who
do have a substantial presence in the forum state.
Starbucks Corporation, for example, has over four hundred
company-owned stores in the State of New York,31 among its many
thousands of locations around the world. If a customer were to sue
Starbucks based on an injury at one of its New York shops, or if a New
York employee were to sue Starbucks for wrongful termination, no one
would dispute that a New York court may render a binding judgment
against Starbucks. This would be a straightforward application of
specific jurisdiction. But if an Alabama customer were to sue
Starbucks in New York based on an injury in Alabama, or if an
Alabama employee were to sue in New York for wrongful termination,
would the New York court have jurisdiction over Starbucks?
Prior to 2011, many courts and commentators would have said
yes. Based on Starbucks’s continuous and systematic contacts, many
would have said that New York courts could assert general
jurisdiction even though the company is headquartered and
incorporated in the State of Washington. Indeed, courts have
permitted general jurisdiction over companies with much, much less
presence in a state than Starbucks in New York.32 But such “doing
31. NY Court: Starbucks Baristas Must Share Tips, USA TODAY (June 26, 2013), available
at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/26/ny-court-starbucks-baristas-mustshare-tips/2459851/ (reporting that Starbucks had 413 company-owned stores in New York at the
end of its last fiscal year, and that the company has nearly 18,000 stores in 60 countries).
32. See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Sec’s, Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2003); Michigan
Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465–67 (6th Cir. 1989). From a comparative
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business” jurisdiction should not survive Goodyear. As discussed
above, the best reading of Goodyear—a reading that the Court should
adopt in DaimlerChrysler—permits general jurisdiction over
corporations only in their home states. Despite the fact that one need
only walk a block or two in many Manhattan neighborhoods to feel the
presence of Starbucks, the company’s home state is undeniably
Washington. In contrast to Washington’s general judicial power over
its home-state corporation, nothing justifies New York’s assertion of
power over Starbucks for claims unrelated to New York.
B. The Home-State Test and Imputed Corporate Contacts
Persons—whether individual or corporate—often act through
agents. For a corporation, it is the only way to act. Long-arm statutes
extend jurisdiction to persons who, either directly or through an
agent, transact business in a state or engage in certain other conduct
directed at the state.33 This is the stuff of specific jurisdiction. One
who transacts business in a state through an agent, or commits a tort
within a state through an agent, and so on, may be subject to the
power of that state’s courts to adjudicate claims that arise out of those
contacts. Such assertions of judicial power over out-of-state
defendants do not violate the Due Process Clause.
The Ninth Circuit in Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, however,
used the agency concept much more troublingly. That court held that
DaimlerChrysler was subject to the general jurisdiction of California
through the imputed contacts of its indirect subsidiary Mercedes-Benz
USA (“MBUSA”) because MBUSA was DaimlerChrysler’s agent.34
According to the Ninth Circuit, general jurisdiction over a parent
company may be established by the in-state operations of a subsidiary
as long as the parent-subsidiary relationship meets either the “alter
ego test” or the “agency test.”35
If general jurisdiction depends upon a home-state relationship
between the defendant and the forum state, then the Ninth Circuit’s
application of agency principles makes no sense. One cannot be at
home through an agent. One cannot be a citizen through an agent.

perspective, broad “doing business” general jurisdiction is a distinctly U.S. doctrine. See
Silberman, supra note 4, at 611.
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3104 (2013) (“As to a cause of action brought by any
person arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any nonresident, or a personal representative, who in person or through an
agent . . .”) (emphasis added).
34. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d 909, 921–24 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 1995 (2013).
35. Id. at 920.
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When a principal acts through an agent who is a citizen of a state, the
principal does not thereby become a citizen. The principal’s conduct
through the agent may subject the principal to specific jurisdiction for
claims arising out of the conduct, but it does not alter the principal’s
home state. While an alter ego theory might provide a basis for
treating related corporations as a single entity for purposes of
determining home state, it is hard to see how agency principles can do
the same. The Ninth Circuit in DaimlerChrysler relied entirely on an
agency theory,36 but the home-state logic of general jurisdiction does
not support this approach.37
C. The Home-State Test and the Reasonableness Prong
In the DaimlerChrysler case, the Ninth Circuit conducted a
lengthy analysis of whether it would be “reasonable” for California to
assert personal jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler. As some other
courts have done, the Ninth Circuit treated the reasonableness prong
as a necessary step in its general jurisdiction analysis.38
The Supreme Court has made it clear that due process requires
an analysis of whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be
reasonable, at least for specific jurisdiction.39 Thus, specific
jurisdiction requires a two-prong analysis. Not only must the case
arise out of defendant’s purposeful contact with the forum state, but
also the assertion of jurisdiction must be reasonable, taking into
account the burden on the defendant, the interest of the plaintiff, and
the interest of the forum state. Although uncommon, cases such as

36. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 620.
37. Moreover, although in the Bauman case (litigated prior to the Supreme Court’s
Goodyear decision) the parties did not dispute that MBUSA itself was subject to general
jurisdiction in California, id. at 914, this assumption is questionable after Goodyear. MBUSA
was a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in New Jersey.
Although it had offices and operations in California and conducted significant business there, no
one would describe California as MBUSA’s home state. Similarly, in Goodyear, the parties did
not contest North Carolina’s general jurisdiction over Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation. See
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011) (“Goodyear USA,
which had plants in North Carolina and regularly engaged in commercial activity there, did not
contest the North Carolina court’s jurisdiction over it.”). In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion
in that case, the assumption may have been misguided.
38. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 924 (“Because we hold that there is ample evidence of an agency
relationship between DCAG and MBUSA, and, thus, that MBUSA's contacts with California may
be imputed to DCAG, we now must turn to the second part of our test: whether the assertion of
jurisdiction is ‘reasonable.’ ”).
39. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985). The Supreme Court has not addressed whether
the reasonableness prong applies to general jurisdiction. See Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 589
n.229.
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Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court40 arise, in which the
defendant’s burden is so significant and the plaintiff’s and forum’s
interests so slight, that the assertion of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable even if the claim arose out of a purposeful contact with
the state.
If general jurisdiction is sensibly confined to home-state
defendants, there should be no need for a reasonableness prong. The
very idea of general jurisdiction is that a state’s adjudicatory power
over its own citizens is reasonable, without regard to the
particularities of the case. Whether the defendant is an individual
domiciliary, an entity incorporated by the forum state, or a
corporation that makes the forum its principal place of business, the
state can reasonably assert territorial jurisdiction over that defendant.
Application of the reasonableness prong to general jurisdiction is an
artifact of an overenthusiastic embrace of “doing business”
jurisdiction. The home-state test should eliminate the need for this
prong by eliminating the problematic assertions of power that it was
meant to address.
V. CONCLUSION
In Goodyear, the Supreme Court applied a home-state test for
general personal jurisdiction over corporations, but did so with enough
ambiguity that clarification is needed. DaimlerChrysler provides the
opportunity. The home-state test aptly captures the idea behind
general jurisdiction. The relationship between a person (individual or
corporate) and the person’s home state gives the state a sufficiently
plenary interest to warrant exercising adjudicatory power over the
person with regard to any dispute.
Like citizenship, the home-state relationship need not be
perfectly exclusive, but neither can it be diffuse. An individual’s home
state is her state of domicile. A corporation’s home state is its state of
incorporation as well as its principal place of business, which in
exceptional cases may be multiple (such as companies with dual
headquarters or whose nerve center and primary operations are in
different states). Outside of defendant’s home state(s), jurisdiction
must be premised on the state’s regulatory interest in the conduct at
issue, not a plenary power over the defendant’s person. Thus, while
individuals and corporations may be subject to specific personal
jurisdiction wherever they direct their conduct, they should be subject
to general personal jurisdiction only in their home states.

40.

480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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The home-state rationale for general jurisdiction reveals the
illogic of imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to a parent corporation
based on agency principles. While specific jurisdiction often is
premised on contacts through agents, it makes no sense to apply the
same concept to general jurisdiction. One can direct conduct toward a
state through an agent, but one cannot be at home through an agent.
Finally, the home-state test provides a basis to jettison the
reasonableness prong that some courts have applied to general
jurisdiction.

